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SLAUGHTER FOR SWAG: AN ACCOUNT OF VIOLENCE AND RESOURCE 
EXPLOITATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO WITH 
STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
 
Larissa Fulop 
 
War in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has become renowned for its 
devastating incidence of violent atrocities and civilian suffering. Fuelled by its 
abundance of internationally valued resources, conflict in the DRC has reached 
unprecedented levels of economic, social, and political strife. Through more equitable 
resource distribution, productive reintegration efforts, the leveraging of multinational 
corporations, and government reform, the DRC may begin to recover and stabilize. 
 
The precarious socio-economic circumstance of violence largely fuelled by resource 
exploitation in Central Africa’s Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is frequently 
described as humanity’s most hostile devastation since World War II.1 Competition 
between various armed factions for control over minerals has been a key feature of the 
conflict, coupled with inter-ethnic tension over land, citizenship, and political power.2 
Since Belgium’s 1908 colonial takeover, the DRC’s supreme wealth in natural resources 
has served the interests of elites and foreign markets to the detriment of the greater part of 
the Congolese.3 A history of volatile political leadership and cyclic poverty has facilitated 
the by and large illegal trade of these most sought-after materials between fighting rebel 
groups and global corporations, funding local arms proliferation on one hand while 
furnishing the invention and sale of popular technologies in industrialized societies on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Prendergast, “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the 
Worst Sexual Violence in the World,” Enough Project, 2009. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” Global Witness Briefing Paper, December 2009, 4. 
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other.4 Despite gaining widespread international attention in recent years, the DRC has 
realized only modest progress with respect to sustainable conflict resolution.  
This paper analyzes the effect of ever-present inter-ethnic hostility on the life, 
liberty, and security of the local populace as well as the mutual danger of questionable 
conflict-metal trade between Congolese warlords and international corporate players. 
While the illegitimate trade of primary commodities may not have been a primary cause 
of war, it certainly begot an economic component that has prolonged the conflict by 
creating incentives for belligerents to maintain a chaotic state for self-interested gain.5 
Disarmament, accountability for the trafficking of valuable goods, and ethical governance 
will ideally advance the ultimate goal of sustainable peace; this paper evaluates both the 
strengths and shortcomings of past peace-building efforts, elaborates on current regional 
solutions to violence and crime, and proposes recommendations for integrated social 
harmony and responsible trade. 
The current conflict in the DRC has origins in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, in which 
an estimated 800,000 people were murdered owing to rivalry between the minority, 
ruling Tutsi and majority Hutu peoples.6 Complex ethnic strife resulted in the 
displacement of large numbers of Hutu in the north along with periodic Hutu killings of 
Tutsi in the south, prompting an influx of refugees into the DRC and other bordering 
nations.7 Hutu militants and key leaders in the Rwandan genocide, known as the FDLR, 
took refuge in eastern Congo, increasing internal instability and setting the stage for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 Yinuo Geng, “Resource Exploitation & Peace-Building in the D.R.C.” The Toronto 
Globalist, 2009. 
6 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” 9. 
7 Ibid. 
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First and Second Congo Wars.8 President Mobutu Sese Seko ordered the Tutsi ethnic 
group out of his country but was instead overthrown by a coalition of Tutsi and other 
anti-Mobutu rebels.9 When Laurent Kabila was installed as president of the DRC in 
1997,10 he promised to alleviate debt and to put an end to the 32-year dictatorship and 
human rights violations committed under the kleptocracy of his predecessor.11 In actual 
fact, Kabila made little progress in the domain of human rights. Additionally, his 
expulsion of Rwandan militants and refugees brought on the end of the DRC’s amity with 
Rwanda, a key ally who, along with Uganda, had facilitated Kabila’s rise to power.12 
Despite this massive Rwandan repatriation, various successor organizations to the 
Hutu militants, FDLR, and Ugandan forces continue to operate in eastern DRC with 
economic interests in mineral-rich zones.13 This eastern region of the DRC furnishes easy 
access to export routes via towns such as Goma, Bunia and Butembo, bypassing 
government-held Kinshasa.14 Minerals can then be illegally exported through Uganda, 
Rwanda and Burundi, transited through Tanzania and Kenya, processed in Asia, and 
finally sold in the global marketplace.15 Conflict today persists mainly in the eastern 
North-Kivu region between factions seeking resource control and political power despite 
the deployment of a massive UN peacekeeping mission to monitor a new ceasefire in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 BBC News, “Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo—A Chronology of Key 
Events,” 2010. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” 6. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Prendergast, “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the 
Worst Sexual Violence in the World.” 
14 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” 8. 
15 Ibid. 
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2000 and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops in 2003.16 Following a 
transitional government instituted in 2003 to move toward leadership founded on a 
consensus constitution, Joseph Kabila was democratically elected in 2006.17 His 
attentions are focused on finding a peaceful means of ending the civil war through 
negotiations and agreements with Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebel groups. 
This is not to say, however, that the national army is by any means benign; in a 
series of reports, Human Rights Watch has documented the killing and rape of the very 
people it is meant to be protecting.18 Congolese Tutsi rebel leader Laurent Nkunda, 
opposed to the FDLR’s continued presence in the DRC, began to clash with the UN-
backed Congolese army (FARDC).19 Nkunda derailed the Goma Peace agreement and the 
Amani process in 2008 following new fighting between army troops and Nkunda’s 
CNDP.20 He was captured during a joint operation between Congolese and Rwandan 
militaries seeking out Hutu rebels in 2009, and is currently living under ‘house arrest’ in 
Kigali.21 Under the new leadership of Bosco Ntaganda, Nkunda’s CNDP has begun to 
integrate with the national army and is accused of atrocities while fighting under its 
name.22 Building peace in the DRC’s troubled regions requires sustained intervention by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Wairagala Wakabi, “Sexual Violence Increasing in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo,” The Lancet 371 no. 15 (2008): 15. 
17 BBC News, “Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo—A Chronology of Key 
Events.” 
18 Human Rights Watch, “Sexual Violence in Congo: Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders 
Who Condone,” 2009. 
19 BBC News, “Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo—A Chronology of Key 
Events.” 
20 Ibid. 
21 Thijs Bouwknegt, “Laurent Nkunda’s Fate Still Unclear,” Radio Netherlands 
Worldwide, 2010. 
22 David Smith, “Congo Conflict: ‘The Terminator’ lives in luxury while peacekeepers 
look on,” The Guardian, 2010. 
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a wide range of stakeholders to address aspects of the regional political economy that 
perpetrate cross-border abuses of the country’s abundant resources. Consequently, the 
DRC may realize reductions in pervasive sexual violence, a dissipation of antagonism 
between political divisions, and the disarmament of both rebel and government militias 
that endorse the conscription of underage fighters. 
A glut of warfare tragedy has chronically plagued this Central African nation 
since the Congo Wars; men, women, and children are routinely subject to torture, 
plunder, killings, arbitrary arrest, and forced labour.23 Sexual violence in particular has 
come to elicit vast international attention due to unprecedented numbers of victims and 
the brutality with which the attacks are carried out; families are destroyed, communities 
are decimated, and sexually transmitted diseases are lethally spread.24 War crimes and 
crimes against humanity in the DRC have no boundaries. They are committed arbitrarily, 
notwithstanding factors such as a victim’s ethnic or political affinity with the perpetrator. 
This tends to be more frequent in armed groups with unclear, parallel, or otherwise 
dysfunctional accountability and command structures, characteristics apparent in rebel 
organizations such as the CNDP or Mai Mai, the Congolese armed forces (FARDC), and 
the security sector alike.25 
Both rebel groups and the FARDC are guilty of conscripting local children as 
soldiers. Boys and girls alike are subjected to sexual abuse, forced labour, and drug-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Prendergast, “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the 
Worst Sexual Violence in the World.” 
24 Maria E. Bazz and Maria Stern, “Understanding and addressing conflict-related sexual 
violence: Lessons learned from the Democratic Republic of Congo,” The Nordic Africa 
Institute, Policy Notes 3 (2010): 2. 
25 Wakabi, “Sexual Violence Increasing in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 15. 
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induced corruption.26 While many are abducted, others join under duress with the hope of 
being able to support their families with what little material compensation they might 
receive.27 Deprived of food, medical assistance, and education, these damaged youth are 
more likely to prosper as rebels in adulthood than by attempting to reintegrate with their 
former cohabitants, which propagates the distorted idea that violence is rewarding. The 
abuse, abduction, and displacement of unarmed civilians persists largely as a 
consequence of sleazy power struggles between legitimate—yet unlawful—and 
illegitimate authorities. The Congolese have come to terms with the fact that it makes no 
difference who is in control: “they all come to loot the minerals and kill those who get in 
their way”.28 
From abduction to gang rape and genital mutilation, sexual violence as a product 
of institutional dysfunction must be understood in the context of hostile civil-military 
relations rooted in the country’s complex history.29 A combination of poor living 
conditions and modest nationalist support for the armed forces has engendered disrepute 
for state security personnel.30 Government soldiers and security sector officials often 
defend violence against civilians as a need to redeem respect by “teaching them a lesson” 
or “punishing” them for their insolence.31 On the other hand, a weak justice and penal 
system in the DRC has sustained a climate of widespread impunity, generating a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Prendergast, “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the 
Worst Sexual Violence in the World.” 
27 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” 8. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Wakabi, “Sexual Violence Increasing in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 15. 
30 Bazz and Stern, “Understanding and addressing conflict-related sexual violence: 
Lessons learned from the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2. 
31 Ibid. 
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normalization of sexual and other violence against civilians.32 This fosters a situation 
where other violence may not receive adequate attention and resources from the 
international community, forcing desperate and insolvent women who are not rape 
victims to present themselves as such in order to gain access to aid services.33  
Although talks of sexual violence thus far have espoused an image of the female 
victim and the male perpetrator, men and boys are often subject to rape, forced to have 
sex with kin, or are sexually humiliated in public.34 The highest percentage of reported 
male rape victims is 10 percent;35 the true figures are likely higher but remain obscured 
by social stigma. A major problem with this invisibility of men and boys as victims of 
sexual violence is that they are denied legitimate rights to aid and recognition as 
survivors. The medical, psychological, and social effects of both sexual violence and 
other violence are devastating, resulting in the displacement of families or individuals 
due to shame, injury, or unrelenting fear, which in turn grossly hinders reintegration 
efforts.36 As physical and economic insecurity continue to characterize the lives of the 
Congolese, comprehensive health and support services ought to be provided to all 
destitute women, girls, men, and boys, since sexual violence and other violence emanate 
from the same fundamental issues. 
It is no coincidence that some of the gravest and most widespread human rights 
abuses in the DRC have occurred in regions abundant in natural resources. In terms of 
untapped mineral wealth estimated at $25-trillion in value, the DRC is perhaps the richest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Wakabi, “Sexual Violence Increasing in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 16. 
33 Bazz and Stern, “Understanding and addressing conflict-related sexual violence: 
Lessons learned from the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 3. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Wakabi, “Sexual Violence Increasing in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 16. 
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country on Earth.37 However, these resources are frequently prone to violent exploitation, 
which finances the conflict at great cost to the local populace.38 The abovementioned 
human rights abuses are committed by the same groups responsible for the looting, 
hoarding, and unwarranted exporting of Congo’s resources, perpetuating an interrelated 
cycle of violence and insecurity with poverty as a product of exploitation.39 Corruption in 
the eastern region has created a power vacuum that facilitates the proliferation of both 
domestic and migrant rebel groups that compete for control over the mineral trade, often 
with the support of the local military.40 These competing militias will rape and sexually 
abuse in order to drive communities out of contested areas or else as a means of 
controlling or subjugating those living in the areas they wish to control.41  
Today, the DRC supplies three to six percent of global tin42 and is home to about 
80 percent of the world’s coltan.43 Adults and children alike are subject to inhumane 
mining conditions by powerful rebel groups who threaten life for noncompliance.44 Semi-
formal systems of taxation, the requisitioning of mineral stockpiles, and extortion at 
mining sites are among some of the tactics used to accrue profit.45 Coined “blood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Iain Marlow and Omar El Akkad, “Bloodstains at our fingertips,” The Globe and Mail, 
December 4, 2010, 1. 
38 Christine Evans-Pughe, “Blood and Treasure,” Engineering and Technology 5 (2010): 
62. 
39 Marlow and Akkad, “Bloodstains at our fingertips,” 1. 
40 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” 6. 
41 Prendergast, “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the 
Worst Sexual Violence in the World.” 
42 Evans-Pughe, “Blood and Treasure,” 62. 
43 Marlow and Akkad, “Bloodstains at our fingertips,” 1. 
44 Prendergast, “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the 
Worst Sexual Violence in the World.” 
45 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” 8. 
8
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol1/iss3/4
	   253	  
diamonds of the digital age,” personal computers and smart phones rely on coltan for 
their electronic circuitry.46 Thus, the DRC’s resources have been of continued interest to 
foreign businesses that inadvertently fuel the conflict by providing rebels with 
independent revenue and a reason to compete over mining zones.47 So long as demand 
for high tech products increases in industrialized nations, aggressive competition over 
mineral trade will subsist in Congo.  
The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
announced in 2003 that he would closely monitor the situation in the DRC following a 
referral by President Kabila.48 The ICC has not publicly indicted Laurent Nkunda, but has 
opened investigations into the actions of his CNDP militia accused of serious human 
rights abuses during its independent five-year rebellion.49 In January 2009, special 
representative of the UN Secretary General in the DRC, Alan Doss, decided to link the 
UN’s overstretched and shorthanded peacekeeping force (MONUC) with anti-FDLR 
military offensives launched by Kabila (Vircoulon 2010). He argued that joint MONUC-
FARDC operations may enhance the reputation of the national army, and that Congolese 
authorities may endeavour to significantly improve the abusive behaviour of their 
soldiers in exchange for UN logistical support.50 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Marlow and Akkad, “Bloodstains at our fingertips,” 1. 
47 Global Witness, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 1993 to 2003,” 21. 
48 International Criminal Court, “Prosecutor receives referral of the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo,” Press Release, 2004. 
49 Bouwknegt, “Laurent Nkunda’s Fate Still Unclear,” 2010. 
50 Thierry Vircoulon, “After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support 
Congolese Military Campaigns?” International Crisis Group: African Peacebuilding 
Agenda, 2010.  
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Interestingly, the CNDP’s current leader Bosco Ntaganda, a general in the UN-
backed FARDC, is also wanted by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed in the Ituri region.51 This bittersweet integration of the CNDP with the 
national army results from the general undesirability of an autonomous rebel militia 
stronger than the national army thriving in the DRC and monopolizing its mineral 
resources. However, Congo’s national army has since become increasingly responsible 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes, as many former CNDP members have been 
reluctant to give up their anarchic ways.52 The government in Kinshasa has excessively 
relied on military operations to suppress local rebellions instead of undertaking concerted 
political efforts and government reforms to more sustainably address problems in the 
East.53 The joint MONUC-FARDC mission has been largely unsuccessful in eradicating 
Rwandan militia in the DRC or preventing FDLR reprisals against civilians.54  Ironically, 
given its efforts in prosecuting the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has 
become a safe house for Tutsi criminals (including members of the CNDP) who commit 
atrocities in the Congo and retreat to Rwanda to evade accountability.55 Furthermore, the 
inherently weak operational capacity and disrepute of Congolese soldiers makes it very 
difficult for them to enforce the disarmament of rebel militias and thus ensure the 
protection of civilians.56 Congolese authorities have disregarded international pleas to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Smith, “Congo Conflict: ‘The Terminator’ lives in luxury while peacekeepers look on.” 
52 Human Rights Watch, “Sexual Violence in Congo: Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders 
Who Condone.” 
53 Vircoulon, “After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support Congolese 
Military Campaigns?”  
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Baaz and Stern, “Understanding and addressing conflict-related sexual violence: 
Lessons learned from the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2. 
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end impunity and adopt a strict selection policy for those who wish to integrate into the 
FARDC.57 Under such circumstances, a successful collaboration between foreign military 
personnel and Congolese soldiers is implausible.  
To the extent that the underlying causes of the DRC crisis implicate conflict-
ridden neighbouring countries, solutions must be regional and, ideally, non-
confrontational. Such solutions must exceed ad hoc emergency responses and instead 
focus on honest, practicable economic ventures and effective governance.58 A 
legitimization of sub-regional mineral trade will ideally compensate those who may risk 
losing more by disarming than they might gain from carrying on illicitly.59 Free trade 
through formal channels will promote a steadier marketplace consisting of safer 
economic opportunities for former militants, eradicate the need for hostile claims over 
mineral rich zones, and ultimately reduce instances of sexual violence as a byproduct of 
multifaceted corruption. Ex-combatants, once demobilized, require assistance 
reintegrating and adopting productive roles. Since the DRC’s rampant poverty largely 
stems from its extractive and outward-oriented economy, the fostering of complementary 
interregional trade has hitherto been stifled. As an alternative to exporting minerals to 
Asia for smelting, local processing may rouse a sense of national productivity and create 
jobs for ex-combatants.60 This cooperative strategy may ultimately reduce the propensity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Vircoulon, “After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support Congolese 
Military Campaigns?” 
58 Raymond Gilpin, Catherine Morris and Go Funai, “Beyond Emergency Responses in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo: Regional Solutions for a Regional Conflict,” USIP 
Peace Briefing, 2009, 1. 
59 Ibid., 4 
60 Ibid. 
11
Fulop: Slaughter for SWAG
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010
	   256	  
for violent conflict through the strengthening of regional economic and security 
networks. 
The DRC’s political economy of resource extraction is by and large induced by a 
shortage of shame amongst international corporate players. Consumers are generally 
ignorant to the widespread use of conflict metals in their daily technologies, so there is 
limited public pressure for corporate accountability. Requiring companies to report where 
and how they are buying minerals such as coltan or to engage in fair-trade programs 
would evidently have the effect of minimizing the profits of a corrupt few who control 
mineral rich zones by means of terror, abuse, and rape.61 Moreover, companies would be 
able to advertise their products as conflict-free—a potentially effective marketing 
strategy.62 America’s Dodd-Frank Act is a step in the right direction.63 It includes a 
provision requiring Wall Street firms to report to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission whether they are acquiring minerals from the DRC or contiguous nations 
along with the measures they have taken to avoid sourcing from regions guilty of mass 
atrocities.64 Implementing a tagging scheme on individual mines in the DRC is underway 
although extremely difficult.65 The International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) has found 
that in addition to being stringently regulated, mines in the DRC are rurally located and 
tend to lack Internet and electricity—a serious obstruction to efficient data collection.66 
The most straightforward solution is for corporations to entirely remove conflict regions 
from their supply chains; sourcing from more peaceful regions would reassure consumers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Marlow and Akkad, “Bloodstains at our fingertips,” 1. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Evans-Pughe, “Blood and Treasure,” 61. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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that their technologies are rape-free.67 Clean trade initiatives will be both time-consuming 
and costly, however, requiring a complete procedural overhaul for many corporations. In 
the grand scheme of disadvantage and inconvenience, the preservation of life, dignity, 
and welfare in the DRC outweighs any corporate concession.  
Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo has created a humanitarian 
catastrophe whereby political and militant extremists have exploited the nation’s potential 
for peace. Addressing impunity by ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable for 
their crimes at this point is ambitious; the ICC will only be able to charge and arrest the 
few most responsible once Kabila’s government comes to realize that negotiating with 
criminals is futile. Leveraging multinational natural resource companies is instead an 
essential starting point. Under the right contractual agreements, these companies have the 
greatest incentive to ensure that the DRC’s mineral wealth first and foremost improves 
the lives of the Congolese. Strong international intervention may help staunch the 
immediate crisis; however, local communities must have ownership in the peace process 
for long-term viability. Encouraging a horizontal model of governance via security sector 
reform is of paramount importance; in Congo this requires a dissipation of resources, 
successful reintegration efforts, a national peacekeeping force that exists to protect 
civilians, and a concerted effort to balance security and sustainable development. 
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